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Abstract This article critically investigates the possibility that private information
offering systematic profit opportunities exists in the spot foreign exchange market.
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than 10,000 traders, we detect transaction behavior consistent with the informed trad-
ing hypothesis, where traders consistently make money. We then work within the
theoretical framework of a high-frequency version of a structural microstructure trade
model, which directly measures the market maker’s beliefs. Both the estimates of the
trade model parameters and our model-free analysis of the data suggest that the time-
varying pattern of the probability of informed trading is rooted in the strategic arrival
of informed traders on a particular day-of-week, hour-of-day, or geographic location
(market).
Keywords Foreign exchange markets · Volume · Informed trading · Noise trading
1 Introduction
Information arrivals and the existenceof informedanduninformed trades have received
considerable attention in equity markets. Easley and O’Hara (1992) have introduced a
sequential trade model in which a market maker learns from both trades and from the
lack of trades. That is, a market maker’s beliefs are continuously updated with new
information that may or may not be reflected in a transaction price. As a result, the
timing of the trade plays an important role in price formation. In a series of papers,
Easley et al. (1996a, 1997a, b) expand this work by modeling an equity market in
which a competitive market maker trades a risky asset with informed and uninformed
traders. Easley et al. (2008) further extend these models to allow for the time-varying
arrival rates of traders. They show that both informed and uninformed traders are
highly persistent in equity markets. In contrast to this extensive strand of research
concerned with equity markets, studies on the behavior of informed and uninformed
traders in foreign exchange (FX) markets are scarce, mostly due to lack of transaction
data for prices and trading volume.
The notable exceptions include Yao (1998), Lyons (1995), Payne (2003) andMarsh
and O’Rourke (2005). Lyons (1995) and Payne (2003) use 1week of trade-by-trade
data while Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) use about one year of daily data. The current
paper is based on a dataset from OANDA that contains tick-by-tick data over eight
months of 2003–2004 or about 6.5 million data lines. The data are anonymized, but
retain the specific trading histories for each of the traders included. To control for
high-frequency noise effects and no-trade periods, we have aggregated the data to
hourly data in the present paper.
This paper contributes to the study of informed trading effects in FX markets in
several ways. First, using a structural model, we identify a geographic (time-of-day)
component in the activity of informed anduninformedFX traders.1 Moreover, fromour
unique high-frequency trading data formajor FX rates,we track individual transactions
to reveal trading behavior consistent with the informed trading hypothesis. Another
important issue we address is the role of informed and uninformed traders in price
1 As in Dacorogna et al. (2001) and, recently, Kaul and Sapp (2009), we use the following geographic
regions to cover the 24-h trading day: 03:00–07:00 EST (Europe only), 07:00–11:00 EST (both Europe and
North America), 11:00–15:00 EST (North America only), 15:00–19:00 EST (post-North America), and
19:00–03:00 EST (Asia).
123
Informed traders’ arrival in foreign exchange markets 1433
discovery as well as their contribution to intraday price volatility. Considering the low-
transparency feature of the FX market, these questions are of immense importance in
understanding the market dynamics, which can lead to new empirical and theoretical
additions to the emerging field of FX market microstructure. More importantly, we
consider the possibility that informed traders strategically time their arrival in the
FX market. Most FX microstructure models fail to account for this phenomenon and
assume that the arrival of informed traders is directly related to the information flow.2
We believe that such analysis ignores potentially strategic, intricate interactions that
can occur in FX markets.3
We draw our conclusions from the data, aswell as from a continuous time sequential
microstructure trade model in the spirit of Easley et al. (1996b). This model measures
market maker’s beliefs and, thus, complements our direct evidence of informed trad-
ing. In our approach, informed trading has a broader meaning: it refers to the ability
to consistently generate profit. Informed trading is interpreted as the ability to realize
profits, where profits are the realization of private information. We find strong support
for intraday geographic dependence in the arrival of informed traders, whereas the
uninformed traders arrive uniformly. The dependence on the time of day pinpoints
two target markets for informed traders: North America and Asia. It is worth noting
that the above-average trading activity of informed traders coincides with low overall
activity in both markets. This indicates that informed traders strategically attach the
largest market weight to a particular regional location, which is similar to the find-
ings of Goldstein et al. (2006) for equity markets. In addition, tracking the actual
trading activity of the consistently profitable, thereby presumably informed traders,
corroborates these findings. The observed geographic component in the activity of
informed traders also constitutes evidence in favor of Covrig and Melvin (2002) who
demonstrate the dominance of Japan in setting JPY/USD quotes.
A few very recent papers demonstrate the existence of geographic or time-of-
day patterns in the FX market, but not from the perspective of informed and unin-
formed trading in a retail trading platform. Gençay and Gradojevic (2013) attribute
the observed intraday trading activity patterns in the interbank electronic FX broking
service mostly to region-specific private information. Concerning the regional activity
and its impact on the FX rate movements, Breedon and Ranaldo (2013) and Ranaldo
(2009) observe that domestic currencies appreciate (depreciate) systematically during
foreign (domestic) working hours. This literature and the current paper are in agree-
ment that FX traders in general trade mostly during their country’s working hours.
Our focus is, however, on the informational content of FX trading, while the latter
two papers emphasize the role of (realized) domestic FX order flow in intraday price
formation.
The fact that our findings provide both direct and structural evidence of informed
trading confirms the validity of the modern FX microstructure literature that is built
2 For example, in the framework by Lyons (2001), customers are the primary source of private information,
but the implications of their strategic behavior are not considered.
3 This line of reasoning has also been documented for equitymarkets. For example, Foster andViswanathan
(1994) find that the optimal strategy of better informed traders is to delay trading on his or her private
information in the early rounds of trading, while trading very intensely on the common information.
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on a premise that private information in FXmarkets exists. For example, Payne (2003)
reveals substantial informed trading effects in an electronic FXmarket. Further empir-
ical evidence on the existence of private information in spot FX markets can be found
in Lyons (1995) and Yao (1998). A theoretical model involving asymmetric informa-
tion in FXmarkets is provided in Vitale (2012). This recent paper shows how informed
traders influence exchange rates by inventory management as well as through their
private information. This work raises the important question of whether private infor-
mation in the FX market is short-lived. A noteworthy finding is that long-lived private
information enables traders to be more strategic in deciding how to optimally profit
from their information advantage. This notion is exactly consistent with our results.
Several recent papers reveal evidence of private information in FX markets. Albu-
querque et al. (2008) structurally identify marketwide private information from firm-
specific information in an equity market and prove its relevance for both equity and FX
markets. Osler and Vandrovych (2009) show that the trades by leveraged investors are
consistently informative for the price. Using a general equilibrium framework, Evans
and Lyons (2012) show that the information content in transaction activity (such as
customer order flow) can predict exchange rates as well as macroeconomic funda-
mentals. Bjønnes et al. (2008) use trader size as a proxy for the degree of private
information and document information asymmetries based on the interdealer trans-
actions of three spot traders at a large Scandinavian bank. Our findings complement
and expand this literature as we are able to track individual transactions of more than
10,000 traders and assess the profitability of potentially informed traders directly.
The model also reveals that the day-of-week effects represent a significant compo-
nent of the trading by both types of traders. We show that the day-of-week arrival rates
of informed traders are inversely related to the day-of-week probability of informed
trading (PIN) values. In other words, when a high (low) arrival rate of informed
traders is observed on a given day, the estimated PIN is low (high). Also, informed
traders strategically follow the arrival rates of the uninformed traders. In contrast to
our paper, Easley et al. (2008) do not find evidence of strategic behavior by informed
traders. They document that uninformed traders seem to avoid informed traders by
“herding.”
The second main contribution of the present study is to quantify the price impact of
informed and uninformed trading. More specifically, as in Odders-White and Ready
(2008), we acknowledge that the market maker’s expected loss from informed trading
is a function of both the PIN and its likely impact on the price. We extract the informa-
tion content of the estimates by measuring the price impact over time. We find that the
estimates of some of the model’s probabilistic parameters can potentially be used to
explain the fluctuations in daily FX returns. In addition, the hourly order imbalances
have significant power in determining FX returns as predicted by Evans and Lyons
(2002).
We also show that the arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders have sig-
nificant power in determining hourly and daily FX rate volatilities. The impact of the
uninformed traders’ arrival on daily volatility is about twice the magnitude of that for
informed traders. On the other hand, the findings for the hourly data reveal persistent
and dominant effects of the arrival of informed traders on FX volatility. In addition,
there is no evidence of the link between the PIN and volatility. The PIN can also be
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interpreted as the proportion of total trading activity accounted for by informed trad-
ing (or the trade composition). The fact that it is uninformative for volatility means
that after sufficient trading activity takes place, information is fully reflected in the
price. More precisely, when the information is fully revealed, the trade composition
(which by definition captures the degree of information discovery) does not matter for
volatility.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the estimates of
the benchmark model. Section 3 examines the informativeness of the model estimates
for the FX rate dynamics, and Sect. 4 summarizes the study’s conclusions.
2 Data and estimation
The arrival of modern internet technology has had a big impact on the structure of
financial markets and in particular the currency markets. The FX market is the largest
financial market in the world with a daily turnover of 4.0 trillion USD, as estimated
by the Bank of International Settlement.5 The FX market is an over-the-counter mar-
ket, where the bulk of transaction volume is handled directly by banks and not by an
exchange. Customers trade their currencies with one or several banks, who are market
makers quoting bid and ask prices. Banks internalize customer flow of buyers and
sellers, and only when their exposure exceeds certain thresholds, they hedge the posi-
tions with other market makers. The big banks trade their excess position inventory
over EBS and Reuters. With the arrival of the internet technology, there emerged new
platforms, such as FXAll and Currenex,6 that aggregate price feeds of banks, offering
a streamlined access to the FX market. The arrival of these new platforms and the
introduction of internet trading platforms operated by the banks increased the effi-
ciency of the FX markets. Today, traders routinely screen the prices of the competing
market markers searching for arbitrage opportunities, and any price inefficiencies are
immediately exploited.
In parallel with this development, a set of market makers entered the space offer-
ing internet-trading platforms targeted for the retail traders. Retail trading is not the
biggest segment of the FXmarket, but it grows quickly and is therefore interesting. For
instance, King and Rime (2010) report that the increased FX turnover from 2007 to
2010 is, among other factors, driven by the emergence of retail investors (individuals
and smaller institutions). Retail FX trading takes place over the internet via trading
platforms or the so-called retail aggregators. These institutions are financial firms (i.e.,
FX intermediaries) that give households and individuals better access to FX trading.
They aggregate bid-offer quotes from the top FX-dealing banks thus facilitating trades
by retail investors. Retail investors are attracted to the FX market by its long trading
hours, market liquidity, tight spreads, and the possibility of margin trading. There is no
4 In a related study, Easley et al. (2008) find that the trade composition does not forecast intraday volatility.
Lei and Wu (2005) also examine the time series properties of the PIN for a panel of stocks, arguing that the
Easley et al. (1996b) model should be extended with the time-varying PIN.
5 See Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in April 2010:
http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf10t.
6 www.fxall.com and www.currenex.com.
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(or little) price discovery taking place at the retail level, but, given the increased trad-
ing volume, banks are keen on getting business from retail platforms. Instead, price
discovery happens in the interdealer market, where geographic location and hours
of operation are the key factors that determine the information content of FX trades
(D’Souza 2008). Papers such as Hau (2001), Menkhoff and Schmeling (2008, 2010)
and Peiers (1997) also report geographic sources of informational advantage in trading
and local price leadership. A refinement of this literature by Moore and Payne (2011)
reveals that information is concentrated among FX dealers that trade most frequently,
are located on larger trading floors, and specialize their activity in a particular rate.
At the retail level, information is obtained through social interactions that contribute
to the growth of active strategies (Heimer and Simon 2012). In addition, Nolte and
Nolte (2012) find that retail investors’ future FX order flow is driven by information
extracted from past price movements.7
A company that has proven to be particularly successful as an internet retail aggre-
gator is OANDA.8 The company has built a highly scalable trading platform designed
for retail and institutional traders. The processing efficiency enables OANDA to offer
the exactly same terms to retail traders and institutions. The traders do not pay a com-
mission, the whole transaction cost is included in the spread. Traders can for example
buy anywhere from one US Dollar (USD) up to 10 Million USD per transaction at the
same spread, which can be as low as 0.9 basis points, equivalent to 0.009%.9
Because OANDA is competitive in both the retail and institutional market, it has
succeeded in building a truly international customer base that includes retail traders,
professional traders, hedge funds, and a limited number of corporations. OANDA’s
customer base is a representative sample of the active trading community of the global
FX market. The availability of anonymized transaction data is unique and no similar
dataset exists to our knowledge. The data offers the opportunity to research the trading
behavior of a large sample of traders that trade at exactly the same terms, which is
important because transaction costs determine, when positions are opened and closed.
2.1 OANDA FXTrade and model-free analysis
Our dataset consists of tick-by-tick FX transaction prices and the corresponding vol-
umes for several exchange rates fromOctober 1, 2003 toMay 14, 2004.10 The number
of active traders during this period is 4,983, and theymainly trade four major exchange
rates.11 The data show that the overall trading frequency increases from Monday to
Wednesday (the peak) and falls from Thursday to Saturday. Using the trader’s identity
7 We are grateful for this and other useful comments from an anonymous referee.
8 www.oanda.com.
9 One basis point is defined as 1/100th of a percentage point.
10 In 2003/2004, the platform of OANDA did not have many decision support tools, so the traders were not
well connected to the professional trading community. If traders can generate profits in a highly liquid and
efficient market, such as the FX market, without access to “inside” information, then this raises interesting
questions of why and how this can be feasible.
11 By “active,” we refer to traders that did not simply receive interest on their positions, but placed orders
during this period. The market share of these traders is approximately 86.4%.
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(trader ID), we next investigate the number of currency pairs traded by investors. We
find that about 33% of the investors specialize in exactly one currency pair, about 11%
in two currency pairs, and about 9% in three currency pairs. This decreasing trend
leads to only 2–4% of active traders who deal in between 10 and 13 currency pairs.
Hence, traders appear to specialize in a small number of currency pairs.
Since the bulk of all transactions (approximately 40%)12 involve only Euro–U.S.
Dollar (EUR–USD) trading, we focus on transactions involving only EUR–USD. In
particular, we analyze all EUR–USD buy and sell transactions (market, limit order
executed, margin call executed, stop-loss, and take-profit transactions). In addition to
price and volume, we know the trader ID for each transaction, which ranges from 123
to 5,904.13 The average number of EUR–USD transactions per trader is 512. Using the
trader ID, we observe that a few traders transact very frequently in this currency pair
(between 10,000 and 25,000 times) over the time period that spans the data (Fig. 1).
We also observe that day-of-the-week trading patterns for the EUR–USD transactions
(trading frequency and volume) are similar to those of other currency pairs.
Further investigation shows that about 98% of the EUR–USD traders close their
positions with a single trade and that about 90% of those “round-trip” transactions
are closed intraday. The average duration of round-trip transactions (τ̄ ) is about 4h.
Informed trading activities are assumed, if a trader makes consistent profits. We find
excess round-trip profits in each month of our sample for 29 traders (and for 42 traders
in the first four months of 2004). One interesting finding is that the trader with the
highest excess return in the EUR–USD market is also the most successful one in
the USD–CHF market. We also identified a single trader that dominates six different
markets (AUD–JPY, AUD–USD, EUR–JPY, GBP–JPY, GBP–USD, and USD–CAD)
and another that dominates three currency pairs (EUR-CHF, EUR-GBP, and GBP-
CHF). Next, to verify the robustness of our findings, we apply a simple, model-free
technique. We compute the price impact of the time t signed transaction on the change
of mid-quote from time t to time t + τ . The idea is to reveal whether (round-trip)
trades “predict” mid-quote movement. On average, we find that the 29 consistently
profitable traders14 are on the correct side of the trade about 90% of the time and that
the total profit per trader is roughly $16,000. In comparison, an average trader in this
market is correct in about 50–60% of his or her trades. Taken together, these results
exhibit transaction behavior compatible with the informed trading hypothesis.
One may argue that over time, purely random trading will lose money via the
spread, but over any fixed time period, there is a chance that random trades will
produce a profit. Note, however, that we find profitability in each of the eight months.
The probability that a trader will be consistently profitable (or not profitable) over the
period of eight months is (1/2)8 = 0.0039. The ratio of the profitable traders to the
total active traders is (29/4, 983) = 0.0058, which is larger than 0.0039. Alternatively,
based on a binomial distribution with parameters n = 4, 983 and p = 0.0039, the
12 The next most active currency pairs are USD-CHF (7.88% share), GBP-USD (7.81% share), USD-JPY
(6.42% share), and AUD-USD (5.98% share).
13 Of the 10,000 registered traders, about 5,000 were active in the EUR–USD trading over the sample
period.
14 Trader ID is withheld to preserve data confidentiality.
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Fig. 1 Top left Total trading frequency (number of trades) per trader (trader ID). Top right Total trading
volume (in the units of base currency—EUR) per trader (trader ID). Bottom left Total trading frequency
(number of trades) for each day of the week. Bottom right Total trading volume (in the units of base
currency—EUR) for each day of the week
probability of observing 29 or more successful traders in all eight months by pure
chance is approximately 0.025 or 2.5%.
It would be interesting to observe when the consistently profitable traders submit
their orders. We find that, on average, they enter the market sometime between 09:00
EST and 10:00 EST. Of all the opened positions, about 95% are closed by 19:00
EST, and only in about 5% of the cases, they are left overnight. This indicates that
these potentially informed traders aremostly active during theNorth American trading
hours. In the following section, we will compare the model-free findings to the ones
implied by the theoretical model.
Table 1 summarizes the institutional characteristics of the OANDA FXTrade trad-
ing platform. This platform is an electronic market making system (i.e., a market
maker) that executes orders using bid/ask prices that are realistic and prevalent in the
marketplace. The prices are determined by their private limit order book. The OANDA
FXTrade policy is to offer the tightest possible bid/ask spread (e.g., 0.0009% spread
on the EUR–USD, regardless of the transaction size). Like most market makers, they
profit from the spreads. Some of the other market features include continuous, second-
by-second interest rate payments, no limit on the transaction size, no requirement for
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Table 1 OANDA FXTrade
institutional characteristics Hours of operation 24h/7 days per week
Number of currency pairs 30












Average volume per day
(EUR–USD)
224 million USD
Transaction types Buy/sell market (open or close)
Limit order buy/sell
Cancel order (reason: bound violation,
insuff. funds, none)
Change order
Change stop loss (sl) or take profit (tp)
Sell/buy tp (close), sell/buy sl (close)
Buy/sell limit order executed (open or
close)
Order expired
Sell/buy margin called (close)
Interest
minimum initial deposit, no charges for stop or limit orders, free quantitative research
tools, and margin trading (maximum leverage of 50:1). Given these market character-
istics, the OANDAFXTrade seems to be designed to attract small, uninformed traders.
However, given the above findings, it is reasonable to assume that informed traders
are also present in this market.
The theoretical model by Easley et al. (1996b) is developed in the context of equity
markets. Adapting it to the FX market requires care. As opposed to the equity market,
the FX market is open 24h and is decentralized. Further, unlike the NYSE, it does
not involve a so-called specialist responsible for maintaining fairness and order, with
an insight into the limit order book. While the NYSE has recently introduced an
open limit order book that provides a real-time view of the limit order book for all
NYSE-traded securities, the FX market exhibits a low level of transparency. Finally,
trading in the FX market is motivated by speculation, arbitrage, and, importantly,
inventory management of currencies. Dealers in the FX market are generally quick to
eliminate inventory positions (typically, they try to clear the inventory within seconds
or minutes for large inventory imbalances). This process is sometimes referred to as
“hot-potato-trading” (Evans and Lyons 2002; Bjønnes and Rime 2005). On the NYSE,
however, inventory has an average half-life of over a week (Madhavan and Smidt
1993). Thus, inventory management is an important component of intraday FX trader
activity.
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The features of the OANDA FXTrade allow us to view it as a “special case” of the
FX market that can be approached using the model by Easley et al. (1996b). First,
as a market maker, the OANDA FXTrade promotes transparency: spreads are clearly
visible, past spreads are published for public view and current open orders on major
pairs are visible to all market participants. In regards to trader behavior, as we only
focus on the informational aspect (i.e., informed vs. uninformed), market participants
in the FXmarket can be treated in a fashion similar to those in equitymarkets. Section 3
suggests how intraday inventory management may relate to the findings.
Our preliminary analysis indicates that overallmarket activitywas extremely lowon
certain days or during certain weeks. Therefore, we eliminate weekends, starting from
every Friday 15:59:59 to Sunday 15:59:59 (all times are EST), including Christmas
week (December 22–26), the first week of the year (December 29–January 2), and
the week of Easter (April 5–9). This leaves us with 145 24-h periods. In order to
avoid extremely high-frequency noise and no-activity periods in small time windows,
we aggregated the data over 1-h intervals. Aggregating over trading intervals smaller
than 1h is not feasible, as this would not cover a sufficient number of buy and sell
transactions for the model to be empirically applicable. On the other hand, longer
trading intervals would “stretch” the assumptions of the model to a certain extent.
For example, the news is assumed to arrive hourly (with probability α). It is unlikely
that the flow of information would be less frequent, i.e., over longer time intervals.
The final sample size is 3,480 hourly data points covering 145 business days, from
October 5, 2003, 16:00 to May 14, 2004, 16:00 EST. There are 667,030 sell and
666,133 buy transactions in the sample period, with an average of approximately 6
transactions (3 buy and 3 sell) per minute. The transaction volume totals 32.6 billion
USD. According to the BIS Triennial Survey for 2004, the daily average turnover
in the EUR–USD currency pair was 501 billion USD. Hence, on average, our data
represent about 0.045% of the global daily EUR–USD trading volume. Nevertheless,
it is one of the largest tick-by-tick FX datasets to be used in an academic study.
Since the trader’s identity is known for each transaction (as stated before trader
identities are anonymized), we are able to identify the number of unique traders in
each 1-h window. For estimation purposes, the number of buy arrivals in each hour
(B ′t ) is defined as the number of unique traders involved in buy transactions in that
hour. The number of sell arrivals in each hour (S′t ) is defined similarly. Therefore, the
arrival of an individual trader who conducts several buy (sell) transactions in a given
hour is counted as one buy (sell) arrival in that hour.
Figure 2 illustrates the number of hourly buy and sell arrivals (B ′, S′) and the
sample autocorrelation functions. We see strong daily time dependence and a time
trend in both series. Therefore, we first estimate the linear time trend, B̂t and Ŝt , from
the trend regression, which is free of temporal and irregular fluctuations. Assuming
multiplicatively separable time dependence, we divide the original series by the trend








In order to estimate a time index for each hour of the day, we average the values
of s̃ Bt and s̃
S
t corresponding to the same hour of the day across the sample and obtain
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Fig. 2 The number of hourly buy (top left) and sell (top right) arrivals (B′, S′) and the sample autocorre-
lation functions at 120 hourly lags (5days). The buy and sell arrivals in each hour are defined as the number
of unique traders involved in buy or sell or both types of transactions in that hour. Sample period: October
5, 2003, 16:00—May 14, 2004, 15:59 (3,480h, 145 business days)
the final hour-of-day indices sBi and s
S
i , i = 1, 2, . . . 24 for the 24-h cycle. The 24-h









, i = 1, 2, . . . , 24
for each of the 145days in the sample.
Figure 3 studies the final hour-of-day indices sBi and s
S
i , i = 1, 2, . . . 24, for the
number of unique buy and sell traders starting at midnight 00:00 EST. The average
number of unique buy and sell traders increases after midnight, rising above the hourly
average before the opening of the European market (at 03:00 EST). Similarly, we
observe a sharp increase in the hours before the opening of the North Americanmarket
(at 07:00 EST). The number of traders declines after 10:00, falling below the hourly
averages after 14:00. They remain relatively low and stable in the subsequent hours
until midnight. In the lower panel of Fig. 3, the sample autocorrelation functions of
the diurnally adjusted number of buy and sell arrivals are studied at hourly lags. The
removal of the daily temporal component reveals strong persistence in both series.
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Fig. 3 Top: Hour-of-day indices sBi and s
S
i , i = 1, 2, . . . 24, for the number of unique buy (top left) and
sell (top right) traders starting at midnight 00:00 EST. Bottom Sample autocorrelation functions at 120
hourly lags (5days) of the number of unique buy and sell traders
2.2 Informed and uninformed trades: When do they arrive?
According to the Easley et al. (1996b) model [please see Appendix 1: probability of
hourly arrival of news (α), probability of bad news (δ), arrival rate of uninformed
traders (ε) and arrival rate of informed traders(μ)], the expected value of the total
number of trades per unit time, E(T T ) = E(S + B), is equal to the sum of the
Poisson arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades:
E(T T ) = α(1 − δ)(ε + μ + ε) + αδ(μ + ε + ε) + (1 − α)(ε + ε) = αμ + 2ε
The expected value of the trade imbalance E(K ) = E(S − B) is given by
E(K ) = αμ(2δ − 1),
which provides information on the arrival of informed trades. When μ is large, the
following approximate relation holds:
E(|K |)  αμ.
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Hour−of−day Index, Informed Traders
DAY 1 DAY 2








Hour−of−day Index, Uninformed Traders
DAY 1 DAY 2
Fig. 4 Hour-of-day indices of informed (top) and uninformed (bottom) traders over 48h, based on unbal-
anced traders (|K |) and balanced traders (T T − |K |). The solid line represents the data free of intraday
fluctuations (the “de-seasonalized” data), while the dashed line represents the raw data. The hour-of-day
index of uninformed traders is relatively stable for the de-seasonalized data, indicating a non-strategic, uni-
form arrival. The same index of informed traders fluctuates according to the observed regional dependence.
For the raw data, the hour-of-day indices of both informed and uninformed traders exhibit similar patterns
Accordingly, the absolute trade imbalance |K | provides information on the arrival of
informed trades, αμ, while the difference between the total trade T T and the absolute
trade imbalance |K | contains information on the arrival of uninformed trades, ε. Note
that our measure of the “number of buy and sell trades” in a given time period is the
number of unique traders. Therefore, we can substitute the term “trader” for “trade”
in the above expressions.
If we assume that the probability of information events α is constant, the hour-of-
day average of the absolute trader imbalance |K | provides information on the intraday
time dependence of the orders from informed traders. In other words, since we know
the number of unique individuals and corresponding trades at each hour of the day,
we can obtain a measure of the activity time of the informed traders. We can simi-
larly identify whether uninformed traders (liquidity traders) follow a distinct intraday
pattern.
Figure 4 plots the hour-of-day indices of informed (top) and uninformed (bottom)
traders based on unbalanced traders (|K |) and balanced traders (T T −|K |). Note that
both |K | and T T are calculated from Bt and St so that we do not expect any hour-of-
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day effect a priori.15 However, the hourly activity of uninformed (liquidity) traders
increases before the openings of the European, North American, and Asianmarkets (at
03:00, 07:00 and 19:00, respectively). Activity exceeds the hourly average from 01:00
until 14:00. Notice that the variation in the hour-of-day index of uninformed traders is
relatively small, fluctuating between 0.95 and 1.04. Therefore, we may speculate that
uninformed traders arrive uniformly at any time of the day. However, the hour-of-day
index of informed traders is almost the opposite of that of uninformed traders. The
volatility of informed traders during the day is high, with the index fluctuating between
0.63 and 1.43. The number of informed traders falls sharply after 01:00, before all
three major markets open. It picks up around 03:00 at the opening of the European
market, peaks and then dips down before the opening of the North American market.
The number of informed traders increases sharply from the opening of the North
American market until the market closes (at 15:00). This is followed by a decline until
the opening of the Asian market (at 19:00). Above-average activity in Asia lasts until
01:00 and declines to the market close (at 03:00). The number of unique informed
traders is well above the average after 15:00, i.e., it extends to the post-NorthAmerican
trading. This number remains above the average (except at the opening of the Asian
market, at 19:00) until before the opening of the European market (at 03:00). To
conclude, informed traders appear to primarily target the North American market and
to a certain extent the Asian market. Recall from Fig. 2 that these are the hours with
the fewest traders present in the market. The hour-of-day indices do not indicate the
above-average arrival of informed traders during the European market trading hours.
2.3 Estimation of the Easley et al. (1996b) model
As mentioned above, the sample estimates of E(T T ) and E(|K |) provide prior infor-
mation about the parameters of the Easley et al. (1996b) model. The sample mean of









Accordingly, the implied probability that an event is bad news is 0.47 (δ̄ = (1
−0.07)/2 = 0.47). Uninformed buy and sell traders arrive at an hourly rate of ε. As
E(T T ) = αμ + 2ε = 176.9 = 19.4 + 2ε,
15 We also plot the hour-of-day indices for the raw data that use unadjusted Bt and St (dashed line).
Similar arrival patterns are observed for the two types of traders. Thus, “hidden” hour-of-day patterns are
present even after Bt and St are de-seasonalized. Since these effects are strong enough to persist even after
adjusting for intraday time dependency, we will concentrate on the de-seasonalized data for the remainder
of the paper.
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Table 2 Day-of-week indices of estimated parameters and the PIN
Index Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
SIα 1.14 0.89 0.91 1.1 0.96
SIδ 0.76 1.15 0.95 1.02 1.13
SIε 0.84 1.08 1.09 1.05 0.94
SIμ 0.85 1.09 1.14 0.94 0.98
SIPIN 1.16 0.92 0.91 1.01 1.00
The day-of-week indices are found using the ratio-to-moving average method
then ε̂ = (176.9 − 19.4)/2 = 78.8. Another measure based on the parameters of the
Easley et al. (1996b) model is known as the PIN (see Appendix 2):
PIN = αμ
αμ + 2ε = 19.4/176.9 = 0.11,
for the market maker’s initial belief. The estimated PIN in equity markets is usually
between 0.15 and 0.25. This is relatively low, which may indicate that the number of
informed traders is low (small μ), that the probability of the information event is low
(small α), or both. In this particular case, the market maker’s risk of informed trading
is relatively low.
This estimation uses the above priors as the initial parameter set. That is, we set
ε = 78, δ = 0.47. Since we do not have a prior for α and μ separately, we assume
α = 0.50 so that μ = 38. The log likelihood function in Eq. (11) from Appendix 1
is maximized daily (T = 24) for the entire sample period (145days). As a result,
we have 145 different estimates of each parameter. The two probability parameters α
and δ are restricted to (0, 1) and the two arrival rates to (0, 500), since the maximum
number of observed unique buy or sell traders in our sample is 474.
Table 2 reports the seasonal indices (day-of-week index) of the estimated parameters
and the PIN.16 The probability of an event α is higher on Mondays and Thursdays.
Given that an event occurs, the probability that it is a bad event δ is lower than the
average on Mondays and Wednesdays. Therefore, we speculate that Mondays were
eventful, with good news for EUR–USD during the sample period. This may reflect
that there is a flow of information over the weekend that is not impounded into prices
during the weekend. Although it is possible to trade during the weekend, liquidity is
so low that it is a different market and price discovery.
Figure 5 plots the daily estimates of the probability of an event α (top left) and the
probability that an event is bad news δ (top right).17 The estimated probability of an
event α̂ fluctuates between 0.04 and 0.56, with an average of 0.30. This implies that
there were no days without at least an event per hour. The lowest estimate is 0.04,
16 The day-of-week indices, denoted by SIi (i ∈ {α, δ, ε, μ,PIN}), are found using the ratio-to-moving
average method.
17 The estimates over 145days are stable with regard to the reasonable choice of their starting values. The
only case in which the estimates begin to substantially change is when μ0 > 200 and ε0 > 200.
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Fig. 5 Daily estimates of the probability of an event α (top left), the probability that an event is bad news
δ (top right), the arrival rate of uninformed traders ε (bottom left), and the arrival rate of informed traders
μ (bottom right)
which shows that there was a day with only one event in an hour (0.04× 24 ≈ 1day).
Similarly, the highest estimate is 0.56, which shows that the most eventful day had
14h with an event. The Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and Wilk 1965) rejects the null
hypothesis of normality at the 5% significance level, as the p value is 0.035. Thus, for
this sample, the market maker views the arrival of news as a non-normal process. The
estimate that an event is bad news (δ̂) lies in between 0 and 1, with an average of 0.47
(our initial parameter). Note that (1− δ) is the probability that an event is good news.
For example, the 18th day of our sample covers the 24-h period from October 28,
Wednesday 16:00 to October 29, Thursday 15:59. On this particular day, α̂ = 0.0412
and δ̂ = 0.01. This means that there was only 1h with news (we do not know which
hour) and the news was good (1− δ̂ = 0.99). According to the Shapiro-Wilk test, the
estimate of δ is normally distributed, with p value=0.418. This result is expected, as
there was no significant trend in EUR–USD prices during the sample period.
Figure 5 plots the daily estimates of the arrival rates. The estimated arrival rate
of uninformed traders ε̂ exhibits a sharp increase around the 60th day (in January
2004), from an average of approximately 50–80. The overall mean of this parameter
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is 78.8 (the same as the initial parameter). The estimate follows a normal distribution
as confirmed by the Shapiro-Wilk test. The estimated arrival rate of informed traders
μ̂ seems to be stable with occasional jumps. The Shapiro-Wilk test strongly rejects
the null hypothesis of normality. The overall average of this parameter is 83.5. Table 2
shows that both informed and uninformed traders arrive less often than average on
Mondays and Fridays. The highest arrival rates of both informed and uninformed
traders are observed onWednesdays. It is worth noting that the market maker attaches
a non-normal component to the arrival of the informed traders, which goes against
the assumption that informed traders are risk neutral. Another instance of empirics
diverging from the market assumptions (dominance of uninformed traders) is the fact
that informed and uninformed traders have similar arrival rates. This can be interpreted
as an equal likelihood for the arrival of informed and uninformed traders, despite
the fact that the institutional market characteristics encourage the participation of
uninformed traders in particular.
Finally, the average estimated PIN is about 0.12, lower than that observed in equity
markets. Over the 145days in the sample, the PIN ranges between 0.04 and 0.21. The
seasonal day-of-week indices for the PIN point to Monday as the only above-average
day. ThePIN is belowaverage onTuesdays andWednesdays, and SIPIN is close to unity
on both Thursdays and Fridays. Therefore, although Mondays are viewed as eventful
days with a relatively high PIN, this does not result in extraordinarily high arrival
rates of informed traders. Rather, their activity appears to be more subtle, with most of
their trading potentially taking place on days with lower-than-average news arrival and
high arrival rates of uninformed traders. Hence, the PIN reveals that informed traders
“conceal” their above-average activity on Tuesdays and Wednesdays as well as their
below-average activity on Mondays and Fridays. In all, it appears that the arrival rates
of informed traders are inversely related to the PIN values, i.e., high (low) arrival rates
of informed traders imply low (high) PIN values. This can be explained by noting that
on uneventful days with high arrival rates of uninformed traders, high arrival rate of
informed traders does not necessarily imply high PIN, because there is not much to
be informed about. Moreover, informed traders strategically match the arrival rates of
the uninformed traders, thereby camouflaging their trading activity. For example, if
there is a low arrival rate of uninformed traders and there is no significant news, the
arrival rate of informed traders will also be low. If, however, there is a low arrival rate
of uninformed traders and there is news, the arrival rate of informed traders may be
strategically postponed and will also be low.
2.4 Independence of arrivals
The crucial underlying assumption in Easley et al. (1996b) is the hourly independence
of information events in each 24-h sequence.18 Thus, while deriving the log likelihood
function, we assume that the arrival of traders in each hour, conditional on information
events, is drawn from identical and independent distributions. Nevertheless, consider-
18 Easley et al. (1997b) test for the independence assumption and find that information events in their
dataset are independent.
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ing evidence on the relationship between volatility clustering and trading volume (e.g.,
Gallant et al. 1992), it would be useful to test whether the independence assumption
holds.
As a first step, we follow Easley et al. (1997b) and use a runs test for each day in the
sample. The estimated α̂i ’s (i = 1, . . . , 145) help us to classify hours into one category
in which an event occurs or another in which no event occurs. As noted previously, TT
is the total number of trades. On each day, we order hourly TT from the smallest to
the largest and classify the upper 100× α̂i percent as event hours. We then turn to the
original TT sequence, classifying each event hour by one and each non-event hour by
zero. The total number of event hours is denoted by ei and non-event hours by ni .19
The results indicate that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% significance
level for 72days, although it is rejected for 73days. This mixed evidence necessitates
additional testing. We turn to the Ljung-Box portmanteau test (Ljung and Box 1978)
for white noise next.20
We compute the Ljung-Box test statistic with up to the 10th-order serial correlation
in levels of S, B, TT and K for each day. Hence, we compare 145 values for QL with
the critical value χ210. The null rejection frequencies at the 5% significance level are:
for B (frequency=24, or 17% of the days in the sample), for S (frequency=21, or
14% of the days in the sample), for TT (frequency=23, or 16% of the days in the
sample), and for K (frequency=18, or 12% of the days in the sample). We conclude
that the independence assumption is not disproven by this evidence, as our model
agrees with the assumption on about 85% of days. Easley et al. (1997b) argue that
evidence of dependence does not affect the actual parameter estimates, but does affect
their asymptotic standard errors. Since our inference is based on themean values of the
estimates and small standard errors (relative to the parameter values), we conjecture
that not accounting for the dependence of information events does not have any major
impact on our findings.
3 Price dynamics
3.1 Model estimates, returns and volatility
As a final test of the model’s usefulness, we regress exchange rate returns (and squared
returns) on the theoretical variables that comprise the model. Our regressions are of
the following form
rt = α + γ Mt + vt , vt ∼ IID(0, σ 2) (1)
r2t = α + βr2t−1 + γ Mt + vt , vt ∼ IID(0, σ 2) (2)
19 Under the null hypothesis of the randomness of information events across hours, the total number of
runs r (sequences of ones or zeros) is normally distributed with r̄ = 2ei niei+ni + 1 and σ 2r =
(r̄−1)(r̄−2)
(ei+ni )−1 .
20 For the null hypothesis of independence (or randomness) of information events over I=24h, this test is




I−τ , where L is typically chosen to be substantially
smaller than I and ρ̂2τ is the sample autocorrelation coefficient at lag τ .
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Table 3 Regression results-returns
rt Constant Mt = δt
Coefficient 0.007*** −0.015***
Standard error 0.001 −0.002
t-statistic 6.26 −7.29
p value 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.2675
This table reports the results of the OLS regression: rt = α + γ Mt + vt , t = 1, . . . , 145. The dependent
variable (rt ) is the return for the spot EUR/USD exchange rate at time t . The explanatory variable is the
probability of a bad information event (δt ). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01 levels, respectively
where rt = ln(Pt ) − ln(Pt−1), Mt ∈ {αt , δt , εt , μt } and t = 1, . . . , 145. By Pt
we denote the daily close (EUR/USD) on day t , where the EUR is the base cur-
rency. Table 3 reports the results for the Mt variables found to be significant in
the first regression. Since the estimate for δt is statistically significant with a rela-
tively high adjusted R2 value (0.2675), these results essentially confirm those from
Easley et al. (1997b), which also find the probability of bad news informative for
price determination. However, their estimated coefficient on the bad event probability
variable is much larger than our γ̂ . More specifically, we find that a 1exchange rate
by about 1.5 cents, while the estimate in Easley et al. (1997b) is 0.61. This suggests
that the equity market is more responsive than the FX market to the arrival of bad
news.
We next discuss the results of regressing the squared FX returns, i.e., the measure of
daily volatility, on the arrival rates (the only variables that are statistically significant
in the second regression). We find that the impact of both arrival rates on volatility
is positive and statistically significant. According to Table 4, the magnitude of the
estimated γ for εt is about two times larger than that for μt . Since the PIN is insignif-
icant in the second regression, we conclude that although volatility increases with the
arrival rates of traders, it is independent of the trade composition.
Finally, to address the issue of the potentially strategic arrival of informed traders,
we conduct Granger causality tests between the trader arrival rates. Essentially, the
Granger causality test assesses the ability of one series to forecast another. The idea
is that if the informed traders move strategically to match the activity of uninformed
traders, we may be able to forecast their arrival.
Granger causality between εt and μt is estimated using a standard bivariate frame-
work. In Table 5, we report the results of regressions estimated with two lags. The
results are similar if we change to 1, 3, or more lags. We cannot reject the hypoth-
esis that the arrival rates of informed traders do not Granger-cause the arrival rates
of uninformed traders. However, we can reject the hypothesis that the arrival rates of
uninformed traders do not cause the arrival rates of informed traders. This indicates
that our conjecture of the strategic arrival of informed traders is valid. Combined with
the findings from previous sections, this suggests that uninformed traders arrive first,
while informed traders follow after strategically timing their arrival. Therefore, the
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Table 4 Regression results-volatility
r2t Constant r
2
t−1 Mt = μt
Coefficient 0.000*** −0.205** 3.25e−07*
Standard error 0.000 0.081 1.72e−07
t-statistic 2.70 −2.51 1.89




t−1 Mt = εt
Coefficient 0.000 −0.218*** 7.03e−07**
Standard error 0.000 0.081 3.04e−07
t-statistic 0.73 −2.67 2.31
p value 0.466 0.008 0.022
Adjusted R2 0.0626
This table reports the results of the OLS regression: r2t = α + βr2t−1 + γ Mt + vt , t = 1, . . . , 145. The
dependent variable (r2t ) is the squared return for the spot EUR/USD exchange rate at time t . The explanatory
variables are the lagged squared returns (r2t−1), the arrival rate of informed traders (μt ), and the arrival rate
of uninformed traders (εt ). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively
Table 5 Granger causality tests using daily observations
Null hypothesis χ2 Prob > χ2
μt does not cause εt 2.51 0.28
εt does not cause μt 7.77 0.02
This table lists the probabilities fromGranger causality tests on the estimates of the arrival rates for 145days
in the sample. The test statistic is distributed as χ2(d f = 2), with critical value χ2cr=5.991 for the 5%
significance level. The null hypothesis is stated in the first column. μt and εt (t = 1, . . . , 145) denote the
arrival rates of the informed and uninformed traders, respectively. The estimations are based on a standard
bivariate framework. The figures in the third column are the probabilities of rejection
assumption that informed traders are risk neutral is not appropriate in the FX market
context.21
3.2 Trading, returns, and volatility
Section 2 presented the hour-of-day indices of informed and uninformed traders based
on unbalanced traders (|K |) and balanced traders (T T −|K |). By definition, K repre-
sents “trade imbalances” and can be interpreted as a variant of the market order flow
21 One may expect the arrival of informed traders to be related only to the information flow. However, in
this setting, they appear to use their private information strategically. Another possibility is that informed
traders enter the market not only to establish speculative positions (information effects), but also to adjust
their currency inventory (inventory effects), as previously mentioned.
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Table 6 Trade imbalance regression results
rt Constant Kt
Coefficient 4.12e−05* −2.37e−05***
Standard error 2.39e−05 9.90e−07
t-statistic 1.72 −23.98
p value 0.085 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.1417
This table reports the results of the OLS regression: rt = α + βKt + vt , t = 1, . . . , 3479. The dependent
variable (rt ) is the hourly return for the spot EUR/USD exchange rate at time t . The explanatory variable
is the trade imbalance (Kt ) aggregated over a 1-hour period. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively
(Evans and Lyons 2002). We test whether this variable can “explain” FX returns on
an hourly basis by running the following regression:
rt = α + βKt + vt , vt ∼ IID(0, σ 2), t = 1, . . . , 3479 (3)
where rt is defined as before and Kt = St − Bt for each hour. Table 6 lists the
estimates, demonstrating that trade imbalances significantly determine hourly returns.
Essentially, a one-unit increase in the trade imbalance (i.e., one additional unique
seller relative to the buyers of the EUR over the 1h period) significantly decreases the
EUR/USD exchange rate returns by 2.37e-05, i.e., the EUR depreciates. This confirms
evidence from Evans and Lyons (2002) and many other authors who have documented
(contemporaneous) microstructure effects in the FX market. We find it worthwhile to
stress that price discovery typically does not occur in the retail market and our results
should be interpreted with care. At best, the evidence shows that informed traders may
operate and strategize in both the retail and interbank FX markets. The same note of
caution applies to the remainder of the regressions in this subsection.
Since Kt is quite different from the order flow definition typically used in the FX
microstructure literature (see, e.g., Lyons 2001; order flow is the difference between
buyer-initiated and seller-initiated transactions), it would be useful to understand the
relationship between the two measures more clearly. For that purpose, we construct
hourly and dailymarket order flows based on the total buying and selling volumes. The
OANDA FXTrade lists the transaction type and that allows us to aggregate buy/sell
market orders. We follow this by regressing the exchange rate returns on order flow, as
in Eq. (3). Table 7 shows the results of using both daily and hourly data. As expected,
the impact of the order flow on FX returns is significant and positive in both cases:
an increase in market order flow is related to the EUR appreciation against the USD.
Surprisingly, the trade imbalance seems to be a more appropriate explanatory variable
for the hourly data. Also, in line with other studies (Evans and Lyons 2005, Gradojevic
2007), the explanatory power of order flow increaseswith the aggregation to daily data,
where the adjusted R2 = 0.09. It is possible that the information content of order flow
is obscured by high-frequency noise and that this effect becomes more pronounced
through aggregation. On the other hand, by counting the number of unique buyers and
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Table 7 Order flow regression results
rt Hourly Daily
Constant Xt Constant Xt
Coefficient 7.00e−06 5.67e−11*** 0.0001396 1.33e−10***
Standard error 0.0000255 6.52e−12 0.0005237 3.20e−11
t-statistic 0.27 8.70 0.27 4.17
p value 0.784 0.000 0.790 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.0210 0.0866
This table reports the results of the OLS regression: rt = α + βXt + vt . The dependent variable (rt ) is the
hourly or daily return for the spot EUR/USD exchange rate at time t . The explanatory variable is market
order flow (Xt ) aggregated over 1-h (Hourly) or 24-h (Daily) periods. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively
sellers, the trade imbalance variable reduces the impact of the returning, more frequent
traders whose trades may be less informative.
Since |K | and T T −|K | contain information on the hourly arrival of informed and
uninformed traders, we next examine their explanatory power with respect to hourly
returns, using a regression similar to Eq. (1). Specifically, we run two regressions:
one with Mt = |Kt | and one with Mt = T Tt − |Kt | (t = 1, . . . , 3479). To pin down
the hourly impact of informed and uninformed trading on returns, we aggregate the
information for each hour over 145days (144 FX returns). This yields 24 regressions,
each with 144 observations. The top two panels of Figure 6 show the absolute value
of γ̂i (i = 0, . . . , 23) for both types of traders. The top right panel models the series
of regression coefficients using a cubic spline function.22 This transformation is con-
venient because it provides smooth transition in the trader behavior over the 24-h
cycle.
The price impact is time-varying, and when significant, is more pronounced among
informed traders. Strong geographic dependence emerges again. The first region of
activity commences at 03:00, the opening of the European market. This region ends
after the opening of the North American market (at 07:00). We also observe a signifi-
cant price impact before the closing of North American trading and during most of the
hours of operation in Asia. These findings are in line with those for the hour-of-day
index fromSect. 2. Therefore, in general, the above-average arrival of informed traders
has a substantial effect on the exchange rate movements.
Our final objective is to assess the impact of the hourly arrival of informed and
uninformed traders on FX volatility. We estimate Eq. (2) with hourly squared returns
and, as before, use Mt = |Kt | for informed traders and Mt = T Tt − |Kt | for unin-
formed traders (t = 1, . . . , 3479). Here, we follow the same approach as for returns.
The bottom two panels of Figure 6 show the estimated γ̂i (i = 0, . . . , 23) for both
types of traders.
22 Cubic spline is an interpolationmethod that fits a curve by constructing piecewise third-order polynomials
that pass through original data points (Burden and Faires 2004).
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Fig. 6 Top left Geographic dependence of the impact of the traders on hourly FX returns. Top right
Geographic dependence of the impact of the traders on hourly FX returns smoothed using the cubic spline
interpolationmethod.Bottom leftGeographic dependence of the impact of the traders onhourlyFXvolatility.
Bottom right Geographic dependence of the impact of the traders on hourly FX volatility smoothed using
the cubic spline interpolation method. The absolute value of γ̂i (the impact of informed traders on FX
returns or volatility) for each hour (i = 0, . . . , 23) related to informed traders is given by a solid line. γ̂i ’s
(the impact of uninformed traders on FX returns or volatility) for uninformed traders are given by a dashed
line. Sample period: October 5, 2003, 16:00—May 14, 2004, 15:59 (3,480h, 145 business days)
We observe that informed traders dominate uninformed traders with regard to their
influence on hourly FX volatility. The strongest geographic dependence effects take
place when both North America and Europe are open, i.e., between roughly 07:00 and
11:00. During these particular hours, informed traders appear capable of driving FX
volatility and, to a certain degree, FX returns, despite below-average arrival. Hence,
this exercise extracts local information that was not obvious from the theoretical
microstructure model.23
It is also of interest to explore the different patterns of FX volatility responses to
daily and hourly arrival rates of informed/uninformed traders. Recall that the impact
of ε on volatility is more than twice as much as the impact of μ. First, we compute
the percentile of daily volatility operated in by informed and uninformed traders.
This is done by comparing the absolute daily changes in volatility to the regression
23 The Granger causality tests for the hourly arrivals yield findings similar to those for the daily arrival
rates: T Tt − |Kt | Granger-causes |Kt |, but not vice-versa.
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coefficients (γ ) onμ and ε in Eq. (2), listed in Table 4. Based on the estimated volatility
percentiles, we find that informed traders operate in roughly the 1st percentile, while
uninformed traders operate between the 1st and the 5th percentiles. We follow the
same procedure for hourly data, finding that the range of γ from Figure 6 (bottom
panel) falls into the 25th percentile for informed traders. Further, the range of γ for
uninformed traders is more narrow. We find that they operate in roughly the 10th
percentile of hourly volatility changes. As the correlation of the daily arrival rates for
uninformed traders with volatility is more dominant at the lower frequency, one can
conclude that uninformed traders are not risk seekers. Also, it appears that the impact
of informed traders on hourly volatility becomes averaged out (more than it does for
the uninformed traders) when it is translated into the daily data.
4 Conclusions
This paper utilizes a unique transaction-level dataset from OANDA to search for
direct evidence of realized private information in terms of consistent profitability
in an electronic spot FX market. To complement this analysis, we develop a high-
frequency version of the structural model by Easley et al. (1996b) for the FX market
and estimate parameters reflecting the market maker’s beliefs about the exact intraday
arrival of informed and uninformed traders. Using the model, we also estimate the
impact of informed and uninformed currency order flows on the price and volatility.
Our model-free analysis reveals that some traders may possess profitable infor-
mation in this market. We uncover two lines of evidence that support the informed
trading hypothesis: consistent trading profitability and the ability to predict mid-quote
movements. These intriguing findings are reinforced by the model estimates which
indicate a strong strategic component in the activity of the informed traders that is
not observed for the uninformed traders. This phenomenon operates at different lev-
els, from the geographic (intraday) dependency to the day-of-week effects, and is
substantiated by Granger causality tests.
What are the traders potentially informed about? An important feature of liquid
markets is that price movements are subject to “dynamic effects.” For example, if
traders build up long positions rapidly and the market price fails to follow through
and starts to consolidate, then traders sit on losing long positions, where a minor
price reversal can trigger a cascade of margin calls. Traders who can spot this type of
phenomenon can generate consistent profits.
We find that the estimates of some of the model’s probabilistic parameters can
potentially be used to explain the fluctuations in daily FX returns. In addition, the
hourly order imbalances have significant power in determining FX returns as predicted
by Evans and Lyons (2002). We also show that the arrival rates of informed and
uninformed traders have significant power in determining hourly and daily FX rate
volatilities.
An important advantage of our approach is that the nature of the OANDA FXtrade
currency orders is directly observable, which attests to the accuracy of our results.
This differs from equity markets, where trade classification data is often unavailable,
and this meant that trade classification algorithms were not required to differentiate
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betweenbuyer- and seller-initiated trades (see, e.g., Lee andReady1991). For example,
Boehmer et al. (2007) find that trade misclassification results in a downward bias in
the estimate of the PIN for the Easley et al. (1996b) framework.
The model assumes independence of information events across hours. However,
we observe dependence for about 15% of the days in our sample. This may bias the
standard errors of our estimates. Though we conjecture this bias to be minimal, it
is worth emphasizing that introducing dependency to the model is a key direction
of future research. The impact of past transactions on current transactions could be
modeled by a latent parameter measuring the degree of serial correlation. In this
context, testing for inter-day dependency may offer broader insight into FX-trading
patterns and strategies. Another future research avenue we envisage concerns the
over-dispersion frequently found in transactions data, which reduces the usefulness
of the Poisson distribution.24 We hope that the evidence presented here will motivate
research on new structural microstructure models applicable to both equity and FX
markets.
Acknowledgments We are grateful to Olsen Ltd. (www.olsen.ch), Switzerland for providing the data.
Appendix 1: independent arrival model (Easley et al. 1996b)
The model consists of informed and uninformed traders and a risk-neutral competitive
market maker. The traded asset is a foreign currency for the domestic currency. Similar
to the portfolio shifts model (Evans and Lyons 2002), the trades and the governing
price process are generated by the quotes of the market maker over a 24-h trading day.
Within any trading hour, the market maker is expected to buy and sell currencies from
his posted bid and ask prices. The price process is the expected value of the currency
based on the market maker’s information set at the time of the trade.
The hourly arrival of news occurs with the probability α. This represents bad news
with probability δ and good news with 1 − δ probability. Let {pi } be the hourly price
process over i = 1, 2, . . . , 24h. pi is assumed to be correlated across hours and will
reveal the intraday time dependence and intraday persistence of the price behavior
across these two classes of traders. The lower and upper bounds for the price process








i , and p
g
i are the prices conditional on
bad, no news, and good news, respectively. Within each hour, time is continuous and
indexed by t ∈ [0, T ].
In any trading hour, the arrivals of informed and uninformed traders are determined
by independent Poisson processes. At each instant within an hour, uninformed buyers
and sellers each arrive at a rate of ε. Informed traders only trade when there is news,
and arrive at a rate of μ. All informed traders are assumed to be risk neutral and
competitive and are therefore expected to maximize profits by buying when there is
24 This point is also made in Wuensche (2007), who proposes mixed Poisson distributions to capture the
characteristics of the trade data. Other potential weaknesses of the Easley et al. (1996b) model can be found
in Venter and De Jongh (2004).
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good news and selling otherwise.25 For good news hours, the arrival rates are ε + μ
for buy orders and ε for sell orders. For bad news hours, the arrival rates are ε for buy
orders and ε + μ for sell orders. When no news exists, the buy and sell orders arrive
at a rate of ε per hour.
The market maker is assumed to be a Bayesian who uses the arrival of trades and
their intensity to determine whether a particular trading hour belongs to a no news,
good news, or bad news category. Since the arrival of hourly news is assumed to be
independent, the market maker’s hourly decisions are analyzed independently from
1h to the next. Let P(t) = (Pn(t), Pb(t), Pg(t)) be the market maker’s prior beliefs
with no news, bad news, and good news at time t . Accordingly, his or her prior beliefs
before trading starts each day are P(0) = (1 − α, αδ, α(1 − δ)).
Let St and Bt denote sell and buy orders at time t . The market maker updates
the prior conditional on the arrival of an order of the relevant type. Let P(t |St ) be
the market maker’s updated belief conditional on a sell order arriving at t . Pn(t |St )
is the market maker’s belief about no news conditional on a sell order arriving at t .
Similarly, Pb(t |St ) is the market maker’s belief about the occurrence of bad news
events conditional on a sell order arriving at t , and Pg(t |St ) is the market maker’s
belief about the occurrence of good news conditional on a sell order arriving at t .
The probability that any trade occurring at time t is information based is (please
see Appendix 2)
i(t) = μ(1 − Pn(t))
2ε + μ(1 − Pn(t)) (4)
Since each buy and sell order follows a Poisson Process at each trading hour and
orders are independent, the likelihood of observing a sequence of orders containing
B buys and S sells in a bad news hour of total time T is given by
Lb((B, S)|θ) = Lb(B|θ)Lb(S|θ) = e−(μ+2ε)T ε
B(μ + ε)ST B+S
B!S! , (5)
where θ = (α, δ, ε, μ).
Similarly, in a no-event hour, the likelihood of observing any sequence of orders
that contains B buys and S sells is
Ln((B, S)|θ) = Ln(B|θ)Ln(S|θ) = e−2εT ε
B+ST B+S
B!S! (6)
In a good-event hour, this likelihood is
Lg((B, S)|θ) = Lg(B|θ)Lg(S|θ) = e−(μ+2ε)T ε
S(μ + ε)BT B+S
B!S! (7)
25 This assumption may seem inappropriate, given that it rules out any strategic behavior. As shown
in Sect. 2.3, informed traders have some tendency to trade strategically. Therefore, we concur that the
assumption of risk neutrality needs defending, but we retain it for the sake of the model applicability.
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The likelihood of observing B buys and S sells in an hour of unknown type is the
weighted average of Eqs. (2), (3), and (4) using the probabilities of each type of hour
occurring.
L((B, S)|θ) = (1 − α)Ln((B, S)|θ) + αδLb((B, S)|θ) + α(1 − δ)Lg((B, S)|θ)
= (1 − α)e−2εT ε
B+ST B+S
B!S! + αδe
−(μ+2ε)T εB(μ + ε)ST B+S
B!S!
+α(1 − δ)e−(μ+2ε)T ε
S(μ + ε)BT B+S
B!S! (8)
Because hours are independent, the likelihood of observing the data M =








Bi !Si ! ×
[
(1 − α)εBi+Si + αδe−μT εBi (μ + ε)Si + α(1 − δ)e−μT εSi (μ + ε)Bi
]
(9)



















(ln Bi ! + ln Si !) (10)
As in Easley et al. (2008), the log likelihood function, after dropping the constant
and rearranging,26 is given by
26 To derive Eq. (11), the term ln[xMi (μ+ε)Bi+Si ] is simultaneously added to the first sum and subtracted
from the second sum in Eq. (10). This is done to increase computational efficiency and to ensure convergence
in the presence of a large numbers of buys and sells, as is the case in our dataset.
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where Mi ≡ min(Bi , Si ) + max(Bi , Si )/2, and x = εε+μ ∈ [0, 1].
Appendix 2: derivation of the PIN
By Bayes’ rule, the market maker’s posterior probability with no news at time t , if an
order to sell arrives at t , is
Pn(t |St ) = Pn(St |t)Pn(t)
P(St )
= Pn(St |t)Pn(t)
Pn(St |t)Pn(t) + Pg(St |t)Pg(t) + Pb(St |t)Pb(t)
= εPn(t)
ε(1 − Pg(t) − Pb(t)) + εPg(t) + (ε + μ)Pb(t)
= εPn(t)
ε + μPb(t) ,
where Pn(St |t) is the probability of the arrival of a sell order conditional on no news
at time t , Pg(St |t) is the probability of the arrival of a sell order conditional on good
news at time t , and Pb(St |t) is the probability of the arrival of a sell order conditional
on bad news at time t .
Similarly, the posterior probability on bad news is
Pb(t |St ) = Pb(St |t)Pb(t)
P(St )
= (ε + μ)Pb(t)
ε + μPb(t) ,
and the posterior probability on good news is
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The bid price, b(t), conditional on St at time t at hour i is
b(t) = Pn(t |St )pni + Pb(t |St )pbi + Pg(t |St )pgi
= εPn(t)p
n
i + (ε + μ)Pb(t)pbi + εPg(t)pgi
ε + μPb(t)
Similarly, the ask price a(t) is the market maker’s expected value of the asset
conditional on the history prior to t and on Bt .
Thus, the ask at time t at hour i is
a(t) = Pn(t |Bt )pni + Pb(t |Bt )pbi + Pg(t |Bt )pgi
= εPn(t)p
n
i + εPb(t)pbi + (ε + μ)Pg(t)pgi
ε + μPg(t)
The expected price conditional on t is
E [pi |t] = Pn(t)pni + Pb(t)pbi + Pg(t)pgi ,
where Pn(t), Pb(t) and Pg(t) are the prior beliefs of the market maker for no news,
bad news, and good news at time t .




i + εPb(t)pbi + εPg(t)pgi + μPb(t)pbi
ε + μPb(t)













= E [pi |t] − μPb(t)
ε + μPb(t)
(






i + εPb(t)pbi + εPg(t)pgi + μPg(t)pgi
ε + μPg(t)













= E [pi |t] + μPg(t)
ε + μPg(t)
(
pgi − E [pi |t]
)
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Let d(t) = a(t) − b(t) be the spread at time t .
d(t) = E [pi |t] + μPg(t)
ε + μPg(t)
(




E [pi |t] − μPb(t)
ε + μPb(t)
(









E [pi |t] − pbi
)








E [pi ] − pbi
)
= μα(1 − δ)
ε + μα(1 − δ)
(




E [pi |t] − pbi
)
If good and bad events are equally likely, that is, if δ = 1 − δ , δ = 0.5. Thus
d(0) = μα
2ε + μα (p
g
i − pbi )
The probability that any trade occurring at time t is information based is
i(t) = Pb(t)μ + Pg(t)μ
P(Bt , St )
= μ(1 − Pn(t))
Pn(t)Pn(Bt , St |t) + Pg(t)Pg(Bt , St |t) + Pb(t)Pb(Bt , St |t)
= μ(1 − Pn(t))
2ε + μ(1 − Pn(t))
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